Skip to content

There’s Information Operations in Them Thar Hills: A Resource Curse for the Hindu Kush

June 15, 2010

So the NYT picks up a story that a lot of Afghanistan observers, (even amateur, pajama-clad bloggers, such as myself!) already knew –  Afghanistan, having spent the past few decades in various forms and intensities of warfare, has large amounts of unexploited minerals and ores, including fuel of the future, lithium. At a time when the United States is suffering the direct consequences of its petroleum addiction, the discovery of the fuel of our post-oil future in Afghanistan is dripping with potential for rhetorical relish. Linking the war on terror with kick-starting a globalized Afghan economy with the mission to end our fossil fuel addiction, the narrative is ripe for the administration (and Thomas Friedman, for that matter) and its mission.

That answers why the US Geological Survey is whipping the NYT and the rest of the media into a frenzy now – of course nobody saw the BP disaster coming, but as the tragedies of recent NATO deaths and pitfalls of the Afghan peace jirga have shown, there are plenty of reasons for pessimism about the Afghanistan campaign, and whatever good news about Afghanistan’s prospects is  certainly politically expedient as the doubts about McChrystal and Obama’s strategy sink in. To be fair to the NYT, any pressure or nudging on the timing of this report likely came from the government, and who can blame a reporter for running with it? As for the intended audience, time will tell who this story wins over. IO ploys such as this can backfire, and already some segments of the public are decrying a war for minerals, or questioning American motives.

Turning to the sharp end of geopolitics and the Afghan war, however, the idea of shedding blood for iron is so imprudent that wholly cold-blooded strategists would reject it outright. Even if the US were to win the war and secure the unexploited deposits, Afghanistan would still be landlocked and bereft of transportation infrastructure. Unless the US wants to use Afghanistan as the world’s least conveniently located strategic ore reserve, it will need to find a way to get those ores to its own markets. But Afghanistan has no viable highway or rail infrastructure to support such an effort. Where would these hypothetical commercial arteries even go? Sending them through terror-wracked and potentially hostile Pakistan is, to understate, suboptimal. Sending them through Iran is an even worse option for would-be American mineral barons. Dreams of a new silk road through post-Soviet Eurasia is also an inefficient and geopolitically disadvantageous route, and the idea of sending all these resources through China would merely strengthen the enemy in the eyes of our strawman plotters.

Unfortunately for the real US and Afghan governments, these are real problems, not just hypothetical ones. The war-torn and underdeveloped transportation infrastructure and Afghanistan’s isolation from world markets are serious problems. Worse for Afghans and the counterinsurgents, however, are the familiar consequences of the resource curse. Afghanistan will need huge amounts of foreign investment, training, and for the immediate future, a lot of foreign labor, and a government counterparty to manage all these deals. This will provoke as much violence as it will prevent, as officials cash in on mining company kickbacks, and the flow of mineral revenue stunts the development of a healthy relationship between the tax-paying citizen and the government whose salary he theoretically pays. While foreign military and development aid already present this problem, nobody should be eager to make a client state a rentier state. This is all glossing over the slim chances that any wealth would enrich broad segments of the Afghan population. As Andew Exum laments, experience points towards a bloody future for poor, stagnant economies flush with resources. Yes, there are exceptions, as an FP piece points out – but internecine violence was not wracking Chile and Botswana when their geese began laying golden eggs. This survey may well be a tragedy for those who live above the riches.

Beyond the Afghan campaign, which will eventually end, the geopolitical and geoeconomic trends this report highlights have strategic implications for America. As the story notes, a Chinese company has already moved in to mine Afghan copper, one Afghanistan’s major industrial projects. This should surprise nobody, China is a neighbor, hungry for resources, and far more willing to go into the troubled lands where Western companies would flinch, and Chinese companies can bribe local officials not with the support, not the reluctance, of their own government. In the logic of realpolitik, the prime great power beneficiary of our counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan will be China – if we succeed, NATO soldiers have pacified Chinese gold mines, and if the mission is more costly than we expect, then there is more US debt to buy and less money and political attention the US can devote to managing China’s economic and political rise. Advocates of American intervention are right, American power provides global public goods. Whether publicizing the potential world gains of American action will encourage China, Pakistan, India, and other potential benefactors to contribute more to the effort in Afghanistan, as the current administration hopes, or merely reinforce the case for free riding remains to be seen.

2 Comments leave one →
  1. July 1, 2010 7:22 am

    Some of the linkages between resource management and conflict can be glimpsed by looking at cases where conflict has been averted. Botswana’s success in managing diamond wealth can partly be explained by good macro-economic policy decisions, but it is important to recognise that these decisions were underpinned by a stable political settlement, unusually favourable world market conditions and effective private property institutions. Zambia, in contrast, managed a sharp influx of wealth quite badly yet did not succumb to violent conflict, largely as a result of its resilient central state. Resource management strategies alone do not explain the onset or recurrence of violent conflict. In each case, conflict is driven by a complex array of institutional, historical and political factors.

    • dptrombly permalink*
      July 1, 2010 9:09 am

      First, thank you very much for the comment and link. And you’re absolutely right – the resource curse has a lot more to do with governments than the resources themselves.

      Furthermore, it would be rather oblivious of me to imply that a resource curse is going to be the primary driver of violence in Afghanistan. A war has been on for 30 years without any help from resource management issues.

      As I mentioned (probably too briefly) in the post, Afghanistan is more likely to exhibit the characteristics of the “curse” because it already has a weak, dysfunctional, and vulnerable government, and unlike most states (Chile, Botswana, etc) where resources have been a boon rather than a bane, Afghanistan is already at war. The post you link to rightly notes that resource management becomes a source of conflict when it becomes linked to narratives of exclusion or marginalization – and a corrupt state at war with a large local insurgency is likely to fall into that trap easily. Are there examples of violent, weak states where resource windfalls have improved political stability? If not, I would think that Afghanistan’s resources are likely to fuel more violence.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: